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Manipulation of Vote Choice 
– Impediment to the Electoral Integrity in Turkey?1
Abstract: Turkey has had a fairly long tradition of regular, competitive polls and multi-party democ-
racy begun in 1946. However, in the last decade, with the consolidation of Justice and Development 
Party’s (AKP, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) grip on power, there has been a growing concern about the 
integrity of elections in this state. In subsequent elections the ruling party resorted to a plethora of 
means inhibiting their competitiveness. Thus, the article seeks to survey the extent of election mal-
practices in Turkey with the focus on manipulation of vote choice as most disturbing group of electoral 
malpractices and, without prejudging, to address the fundamental questions about whether elections in 
Turkey, notwithstanding the irregularities, still meet democratic, international standards, or whether 
Turkey is sliding into electoral autocracy.
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Turkey has had a fairly long tradition of competitive polls and multi-party democracy begun in 1946, with the then decision to hold “regular […] free and fair elections, 
a major turning point in Turkey’s recent political history” (Sayarı, 2012, p. 183). Some 
students of modern Turkey claim that the 1950 elections were a “more important divide 
in Turkish political history than the more commonly recognized official demise of the 
Ottoman Empire and declaration of the Turkish Republic in 1923…usher[ing] in a new 
political era” (Tachau, 2000, p. 130).
Ever since, altogether 19 parliamentary ballots have been held, as well as numerous 
local elections. As a result of a 2007 nation-wide referendum and an amendment intro-
duced to the Turkish constitution, the presidential elections in August 2014 were the first 
direct ballot of the president of the Republic of Turkey by popular vote, hitherto elected 
indirectly through a parliamentary nomination.
Indeed, in the last decades, Turkey has been a country where ruling parties – the in-
cumbents have been losing elections, ceding power to opposition political forces – a fun-
damental attribute of a democratic system, according to the classical definition of Adam 
Przeworski (Przeworski 1991, p. 10). Suffice to say that in the post-war era, alternation 
in power and government turnover has taken place through elections, with no single par-
ty in Turkey staying in power (either in a single party government or in a coalition cabi-
1 This article is a result of the preliminary research within the project “Between Fair and Rigged. 
Elections as a Key Determinant of the ‘Borderline Political Regime’ – Turkey in Comparative Perspec-
tive”, carried out in 2017–2018 at the Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, University of 
Warsaw and financed by the Polish National Science Centre within the funding programme “OPUS 11”.
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net) for more than 10 years. Naturally, Turkey’s democratic trajectory has been upset by 
military interventions, direct or indirect, yet, in times of civilian rule, there was a genuine 
competition between political parties, with the elections as the only means of acceding to 
political power and their fairness never seriously questioned (Erisen, Kubicek, 2016).2
Notwithstanding the fact that Turkey has been holding elections which genuinely 
reflect the popular will, in the last decade, with the consolidation of AKP’s grip on power 
there has been a growing concern about the integrity of the electoral process whose 
deficits supplement the long list of the current Turkish problems in the democratization 
process. It is not that the AKP does not enjoy public support; it does, and probably – as 
the public opinion shows – even without the election swindles, it would garner the larg-
est number of votes. Yet, tinkering with ballots, we believe, contributed substantially 
to AKP hitting the jackpot in subsequent elections, which leads to an ever increasing 
domination of the AKP in the Turkish political system.
The existing scholarship on Turkish elections (for example by Ali Çarkoğlu; Kerem 
Yıldırım; Sabrı Sayarı) (Çarkoğlu, Yıldırım, 2015, pp. 57–79; Sayarı, 2016, pp. 263–280) 
concentrates rather on the traditional description of the elections, their results and po-
litical ramifications, implications for the inter-party rivalry and cultural or sociological 
aspects.3 Thus, the article seeks to fill this gap and survey the election malpractices in 
Turkey and, without prejudging, to address a fundamental question about whether elec-
tions in Turkey, notwithstanding the irregularities, still meet democratic, international 
standards, or whether Turkey is sliding into electoral autocracy. The goal is to investi-
gate the phenomenon of “electoral malpractice” understood as the violation of electoral 
integrity, which means the violation of internationally accepted standards of elections 
throughout the whole electoral cycle. There is a difference between the notion of “mal-
practice” and “mispractice” – the flaws in elections that are not deliberate, but resulting 
from an unintentional error or other impediments. Flaws in one of the phases of the elec-
toral cycle mean that the elections have been flawed. It is particularly important in the 
case of Turkey because the observation of elections in this state leads to the conclusion 
that most problematic in the context of electoral integrity are not manipulations of the 
voting act but malpractices concerning voter’s choice. The article is aimed at confirming 
this observation through a thorough analysis of different types of manipulation of vote 
choice in Turkey. It will help us to answer the question about their impact on the electoral 
integrity in this state.
We vet primarily the March 2014 local elections and August 2014 presidential elec-
tions, as well as the June and November 2015 general parliamentary elections, as our aim 
is to catalogue AKP’s electoral stratagems as comprehensively as possible. For the sake 
of objectivity, we put our analysis in a broader historical context, as Turkey has a legacy 
of undemocratic electoral institutions, with the 10 percent election threshold as only one 
example of the designs, inherited by AKP (and unsurprisingly unaltered by the ruling 
party), which have distorted the broadly understood fairness of political competition.
2 For a more cautious and skeptical assessment of the fairness of the elections in Turkey in the last 
50 years, see: Sayarı, 2002; Sütçü, 2011, pp. 341–356.
3 There are only a few exceptions of articles concerning electoral integrity as the main research 
topic, e.g. Aygül, 2015, pp. 181–201. Most of them have not been even published yet. See e.g. Akkoy-
unlu, 2017, forthcoming. 
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To begin with, we offer a snapshot on our understanding of electoral malpractices, 
underpinning the analysis. Next, the empirical part follows, with a detailed scrutiny on 
the manipulations of vote choice. Finally, in the closing section, we synthesize the find-
ings and draw generalisable conclusions.
Theoretical Framework of Electoral Malpractice
At the beginning of the 21st century we can observe an increasing number of states 
in which elections are held but which do not meet standards of liberal democracy. This 
has led to the proliferation of theoretical studies, published e.g. by Andreas Schedler as 
well as Sarah Birch, Pippa Norris and Alberto Simpser (Birch, 2011; Schedler, 2002; 
2006; 2013; Norris, 2014; 2015; Simpser, 2013), who focus on the issue of the elec-
toral integrity vs. electoral malpractice, including their conceptualization, indicators and 
typologies. What is particularly interesting from the point of view of science political 
is the case of the extensive use of different types of measures (legal, procedural and 
administrative instruments, financial resources, communication tools, first of all media 
and other measures influencing the voters) by the most influential political forces, usu-
ally the incumbent to distort the level playing field between the parties and to enable the 
forces holding power to keep it for the next legislative period. In electoral autocracies 
or other regimes of this kind, electoral laws, as well as the procedures favour the ruling 
party, giving it a leverage over rivalling parties; there are limitations on voter and party 
registration; the dominant party is also favoured as far as the electoral campaign and the 
financial resources are concerned; there are irregularities in the voting process, including 
the counting of votes; and the electoral officials lack impartiality and independence. The 
use of these measures in turn leads to the domination of certain political forces within the 
party and political system in a long-term perspective.
Researchers of electoral studies have come up with different taxonomies and cat-
egorizations of electoral malpractices, which merit a brief review. Norris, in her broad-
ranged Electoral Integrity Project, on the basis of expert surveys, gauges the legitimacy 
of elections across 11 categories reflecting all stages of the electoral cycle: pre-election, 
campaign, polling day, and its aftermath.4 Schedler, on his part, presents the “chain of 
democratic choice”, comprising seven “links” which, for the elections to be “democrat-
ic”, have to remain unbroken – “no links to be added, none to be taken away” (Schedler, 
2002, pp. 36–50).5 These conditions lead Schedler to define the “menu of manipulation” 
– various forms of norm violation, such as reserved positions and reserved domains 
– limiting the scope and jurisdiction of elected offices; exclusion of opposition forces; 
4 These 11 categories are: election laws; electoral procedures; boundaries; voter registration; party 
and candidate registration; campaign media; campaign finance; voting process; voting count; results 
and electoral management bodies.
5 These are: empowerment – the elected must wield real power; free supply – the voters have to 
have a real choice – a pool of candidates to chose from; free demand – voters must shape their prefer-
ences freely; inclusion – the franchise must be universal; insulation – voters must be able to cast ballots 
freely without being coerced or intimidated; integrity – casted votes must be counted honestly and 
weighed equally; irreversibility – those winning the franchise must be able to access office and exercise 
effective decision-making power till the end of the term.
106 Adam SZYMAŃSKI, Jakub WÓDKA PP 3 ’17
repression and unfairness with regard to access to media and financial resources; formal 
and informal disenfranchisement; coercing and corrupting the voters; electoral fraud and 
institutional bias; tutelage and reversal – preventing the winners from assuming power. 
Finally, Alberto Simpser enumerates the following incidences of electoral manipulation: 
stuffing ballot boxes; falsifying results; tampering with voter registration lists; vote buy-
ing before and during the election; creating obstacles to voter and candidate registration; 
intimidating voters before and during elections; intimidating candidates; voting multiple 
times; voting by those who are ineligible (Simpser, 2013, pp. 35–36).
Our paper, drawing on the vast scholarship on the electoral integrity gauges the elec-
toral malpractices in Turkey according to Birch’s threefold categorization (Birch, 2011, 
pp. 29–38). Birch singles out three areas of electoral manipulation:
a) manipulation of the law: it is about the manipulation of electoral legislation, such as 
gerrymandering and malapportionment; additionally, this category could cover the 
manipulation of the criteria that determine the active and passive right to vote, cam-
paigning as well as standards concerning opinion polls;
b) manipulation of vote choice: this category pertains to the violation of the right of the 
voters to access to adequate information about the policy proposals. Most manipula-
tions of vote choice take place during the electoral campaigns (unbalanced media 
coverage of electoral campaign favoring the ruling party/candidate), mishandling of 
resources (breaching of the regulations governing the use of campaign resources), 
vote buying and voter intimidation;
c) manipulation of the voting act: this dimension deals with the violation of the prin-
ciple that all votes must have equal weight. The dimension of “effective aggrega-
tion” includes the counting and tabulation of votes and their appropriate conversion 
into seats. This component may include the obstruction of ballot access by potential 
candidates; the manipulation of voter registration and/or the electoral register; the 
manipulation of voting and of the process of counting and tabulation of votes.
In our analysis we would like to focus on the second group of the electoral malprac-
tices as, in our opinion, they have been the most extensive ones in recent years and at the 
same time most disturbing in the context of the electoral integrity.
Electoral Malpractice in Turkey in Reports and Surveys
Although there is no consensus among those studying Turkish politics as to the as-
sessment of electoral integrity in Turkey, most of them share the opinion that their fair-
ness in the AKP era leaves much to be desired (Kalaycıoğlu, 2015, p. 162; Çarkoğlu, 
Yıldırım, 2015, p. 62). Such mistrust of the fairness of the Turkish elections is confirmed 
in more comprehensive studies, such as those run under the Electoral Integrity Project,6 
which takes elite opinions as a point of reference. The presidential elections in Turkey 
in August 2014 were ranked 86th out of 127 states, with both parliamentary elections in 
2015 assessed even more critically – Turkey was ranked 101st among 135 states (Norris, 
Martinez, Nai, Grömping, 2015, pp. 10 and 17; 2016, pp. 22 and 51–53). When it comes 
6 For methodology and empirical findings, see: https://www.electoralintegrityproject.com/.
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to the elements of the electoral process, the lowest scores were given to media coverage 
and campaign financing – the issues included in the second category of malpractices 
presented by Birch (manipulation of vote choice). The third most important problem 
is the content of electoral laws. The OSCE reports on subsequent elections in Turkey 
(also parliamentary election in 2007 and 2011) correspond to these findings. Although 
they recognize some positive legal changes concerning different phases of the electoral 
process (e.g. lowering voting age, giving voting rights to Turkish citizens living abroad, 
the possibility of use of other languages than Turkish in the election campaign, etc.), the 
broad-ranging electoral legislation still contains regulations which undermine electoral 
integrity. On the one hand, this pertains to some provisions which are not in accordance 
with electoral integrity rules. On the other hand, the lack of certain regulations (e.g. with 
reference to use of media in campaign, financial matters, including reporting on cam-
paign expenditures or appealing procedure in the case of the decisions of the Supreme 
Board of Elections) and ambiguous provisions (e.g. the regulations on competences of 
election authorities) should be mentioned. All of these laws lead to a different type of 
electoral malpractice. The OSCE reports also point out to substantial problems with re-
gard to the use of media and financial resources in electoral campaigns. However, what is 
even more important, they show that together with the growing authoritarian tendencies 
in the AKP era, Turkey has seen a significant increase in the electoral malpractices, limit-
ing more and more fair competition between parties and favoring the incumbent (Repub-
lic of Turkey, Presidential Election, 2014; Early Parliamentary Elections, 2016).
Manipulation of Vote Choice in Turkey
The second category of electoral malpractices singled out by Birch, i.e. the manipula-
tions of the voter (vote choice), show very well the problems with the fairness and com-
petitiveness of elections in Turkey. Birch divides these malpractices into two groups: 
“manipulation of genuine preferences” and “undue influence”. AKP, very often abusing 
incumbency advantage, takes various measures to keep its support intact or even to in-
crease it – to the detriment of other parties whose resources are limited. It should come 
as no surprise then that, as mentioned before, some malpractices within this category are 
classified as the most disturbing for electoral integrity in Turkey.
Manipulation of Genuine Preferences
Without any doubt media bias belongs to the “manipulation of genuine preferences”. 
The OSCE reports concerning subsequent elections in Turkey show that different media 
outlets were not impartial during the election period, which was also due to the ambigu-
ity of the term “impartiality” as it stands in the election laws. Apart from some media 
that tried to be more or less objective (e.g. newspaper Hürriyet), there were such media 
as public TV channel TRT1, private channel ATV or newspaper Sabah, which clearly fa-
vored AKP, the government and President – both when it comes to airtime/length of the 
text devoted, and the tone (positive or neutral), while being very critical of the opposi-
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tion parties (Republic of Turkey. Parliamentary Elections 7 June 2015, 2015, pp. 15–18; 
Limited Election Observation Mission, 2015).
This reflects the de-democratisation process in Turkey which also includes the free-
dom of media, which implies that the ever increasing number of media outlets is under 
the government and AKP’s de facto control. One would struggle today to find inde-
pendent TV channels, newspapers or even individual users of social media which dare 
criticise the government. The ban on websites or publications, the seizure and closure of 
media, censorship or self-censorship, increasing number of lawsuits against journalists 
and other persons for defamation, insulting the President as well as legal cases against 
journalists based on the Criminal Code and Anti-terror law are only a few examples of 
restrictions on the freedom of expression and media – with a rising tendency after 2011 
(Yılmaz, 2016, pp. 147–161).
This creates a substantial problem for the fair competition regarding the use of me-
dia in the election period. The incumbents are favoured in an increasing number of TV 
channels and newspapers during this time (the tendency has been growing since 2011 
elections). Other parties and candidates very often have limited access to the media (with 
the worst situation of independent candidates who e.g. have not been granted any free 
TV airtime) (Kalaycıoğlu, 2015, pp. 161–162; Çarkoğlu, Yıldırım, 2015, p. 77). When 
it comes to the presidential elections in 2014, it appeared that there was no regulation 
clarifying whether the broadcasting time should be provided to the individual persons 
or political parties. This, in turn, gave rise to irregularities connected with the use of 
the office by the president and Erdoğan’s impact on the media. It resulted in a triple 
presence in the TV news of the AKP leader in comparison with the main opposition 
candidate – Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu. Erdoğan had over 47,000 broadcasting time units, 
İhsanoğlu – 16,000 units (Erdoğan, 2014). When the election campaign in June 2015 is 
taken into consideration, there is an impression that there was actually only one party 
running – the incumbent AKP. It was so because Erdoğan’s party dominated the private 
advertising in many channels – with such extreme cases as ATV (100 per cent of political 
adverts) and TRT1 (91 per cent of political adverts). It was possible due to the gaps and 
ambiguity of the election law (blurred regulations on the proper implementation of the 
definition of equal or equitable coverage, limited media reporting and sanction mecha-
nisms) and the privileged financial position of the governing party (Republic of Turkey. 
Parliamentary Elections 7 June 2015, 2015, pp. 15–18). The most critical situation was 
during the November 2015 election period due to the particular election environment 
(fight against PKK, terrorist attacks) when also the anti-terror law and Criminal code 
were used against the media. The pro-Kurdish media were raided by the police and many 
Kurdish journalists were arrested. It substantially limited the use of media in the Peoples’ 
Democratic Party (HDP, Halkların Demokratik Partisi) campaign. All this makes the 
Electoral Integrity Project assess the fairness of media coverage in Turkey lowest among 
all indicators (Norris, Martinez, Nai, Grömping, 2015, p. 10).
The second and third type of electoral malpractice within the manipulations of genu-
ine preferences of voters concern the financial issues. It pertains to the misuse of state 
resources during the campaign and violation of campaign finance regulations, which 
can be traced during the election periods in Turkey. It is clearly indicated by different 
reports, including the Electoral Integrity Project surveys in which the campaign financ-
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ing is the second worst indicator (Norris, Martinez, Nai, Grömping, 2015, p. 10). For 
instance, Erdoğan as the Prime Minister and the presidential candidate in 2014, used his 
public appearances, some of them state-financed, for election purposes. To give a few 
examples – the opening ceremony of Istanbul’s third airport in June or the launch of 
a high-speed train line in late July. He used his prime ministerial jet to address sup-
porters, actually beginning his campaign before the formal date of the beginning of the 
election campaign. It was not in accordance with articles 64–66 of the Law on Basic 
Provisions on Elections and Voter Registers (Republic of Turkey, Presidential Election, 
2014, p. 13). He managed to take advantage over other candidates beforehand, as they 
had to wait to raise the funds and make expenditures until 11 July 2014 – the date of the 
official announcement of the list of candidates. As Kalayçioğlu claims, “it appeared the 
AKP candidate was able to use the resources of his governmental office while the other 
candidates were not. This seems to have undermined the fairness of the election and its 
democratic credentials” (Kalayçioğlu, 2015, pp. 161–162).
Similar phenomena could be observed during the 2015 parliamentary elections. Dur-
ing the election campaigns Erdoğan as the President took part in different gatherings. 
Officially, they were labelled as national rallies with Turkish flags, which the president 
held to meet citizens and thank them for voting for him at the presidential elections, in 
reality though they were part of AKP’s election campaign (Bardakçi, 2016, p. 7).
The AKP used its privileged position as the governing party as well. The ceremonies 
of opening of infrastructural projects, which helped to show the government’s effective-
ness, were organized before the beginning of official election campaigns both in 2011 
and 2015 (Aslan-Akman, 2012, p. 89). The AKP “made the most out of its access to state 
resources in its election campaign: the governing party used public employees to inform 
and mobilise the voters, its officials travelled in planes and cars belonging to the state, 
and its campaign activities benefited from free access to the resources of municipal and 
local governments” (Sayarı, 2016, p. 271). When it comes to public employees, they 
were more eager to help the party in elections, e.g. when they had their permanent status 
extended (in cases of work on a contract basis) or when they were paid from the public 
resources for gasoline in the case of travelling on their own to election rallies (Aslan-
Akman, 2012, p. 89).
When it comes to the violation of campaign financing regulations, it usually pertains 
to overspending and/or failing to declare expenditure or contributions. Again, the August 
2014 presidential election provides a very good example. The financial regulations in 
the relevant election law stipulate that financing candidates by parties or through loans 
is not possible and that the individual support with the use of special bank accounts is 
allowed. However, the lack of well-defined limits (“up to the highest monthly salary of 
the best-paid civil servant” could not serve as a clear indication) could in practice lead 
to large disparities between candidates, depending on their “fund-raising” potential. It 
was noticeable during the 2014 election campaign, in which Erdoğan, being the Prime 
Minister, received much more financial support than other candidates, with the support 
from companies being part of the patronage system (which we will tackle in more detail 
below) and the aforementioned public resources. When it comes to the individuals’ sup-
port, he received about 24 million Turkish liras while İhsanoğlu – 2.1 million Turkish 
liras (Turkish Elections. Presidential Elections, 2014).
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The violation of campaign finance regulations is possible also in the case of parlia-
mentary elections due to lack of some important limitations and sufficient reporting on 
expenditures. The OSCE report from November 2015 elections indicates that: “There 
are no limitations on general party and campaign-related expenditure. Political par-
ties are required to declare their campaign funds solely through annual party financial 
reports submitted to the Constitutional Court. Independent candidates declare their 
campaign funds through personal tax declarations. […] Incomes and expenditure of 
parties and independent candidates during the campaign were not publicly available” 
(Early Parliamentary Elections, 2016, p. 13). During the same elections some parties 
which were under particular attack from the governing party did not receive on time 
the state funds they were supposed to receive according to the relevant regulations. 
Only after the elections did the HDP get the funds. As the authors of the OSCE report 
rightly state, “it limited their campaign abilities and placed them at a disadvantage 
compared to parties entitled to state support” (Early Parliamentary Elections, 2016, 
p. 13).
The advantageous financial position of the AKP having large state and private finan-
cial resources (the latter thanks to the developed patronage system in Turkey) is visible at 
the election rallies, which can gather thousands of people transported with the use of the 
party resources. They take part in the mass events during which they can get free party 
gadgets, toys for children, or food and drinks, which may seem negligible, but indeed at-
tracts voters. The same refers to the election campaign in the streets of towns. AKP is the 
most visible party thanks to numerous flags as well as big posters and banners placed al-
most everywhere, also on special election vehicles – buses or vans. Other parties, though 
also present in the streets, are far less visible. The voters can have a similar impression 
as in the case of the media coverage dominated by the AKP – there is actually only 
one main party to vote for. The same observation can be attributed to the August 2014 
presidential elections. The OSCE observed in its report that campaigns of Ekmeleddin 
İhsanoğlu and Selahattin Demirtaş “have been active, but with limited visibility” (Early 
Parliamentary Elections, 2016, p.6).
The next feature of election campaigns in many countries is the “black arts” of 
manipulative campaign tactics. It is not a key issue in Turkey in comparison to previ-
ous aspects but it can also shape the preferences of voters. As it goes beyond the scope 
of this paper, we would like to give just a few examples. In the case of the August 2014 
presidential elections the smear campaign took place against the journalists opposing 
the government (Republic of Turkey, Presidential Election, 2014, p. 13). When we take 
a look at the November 2015 elections, there were cases of untrue media coverage re-
garding some parties. For instance, the Rights and Liberties Party was reported to have 
withdrawn from elections while it was still taking part in them. When it filed a complaint 
to the Supreme Board of Elections, the Board did not take any decision. It was an ex-
ample of the lack of effective handling of election complaints. This dilemma and the 
problems indicated by a number of organizations monitoring elections in Turkey related 
to the quick rejection of complaints by the Board without sufficient examination or their 
too long considerations led to a disadvantageous position of candidates or parties lodg-
ing complaints (Early Parliamentary Elections, 2016, p. 6). It did not have any impact 
on the results but it looked different when the manipulation of electoral preferences 
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took place as the result of spreading information concerning the main opposition parties 
as it was the case of pro-government media outlets, which, during the November 2015 
elections, presented the opposition parties, namely the Republican People’s Party (CHP, 
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi), Nationalist Action Party (MHP, Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi) 
and HDP as factions responsible for the rise in instability in the country (Çarkoğlu, 
Yıldırım, 2015, p. 75).
However, the cases of intimidation of candidates or obstruction of their cam-
paign activities are more disturbing in terms of fairness of elections. We can identify the 
most striking example thereof during the November 2015 elections, with measures taken 
against HDP, which became the main adversary of the governing party following the 
June 2015 elections. The AKP aim was to bring the support of the HDP below the 10 per 
cent threshold, which would give the former a sufficient majority to govern on its own 
again. It must be underlined that political parties held only limited campaigns at the time 
of conflict with PKK and terrorist attacks, concentrating their efforts on strategic prov-
inces where they had lost or won seats in the previous elections with slight vote margins, 
and in large cities that host a significant proportion of the electorate. However, the HDP 
campaign activities were even more limited by different actions against its candidates 
and members (it is also the case of the 2017 constitutional referendum campaign). The 
intensification of negative media coverage was very clear in the pro-government media 
reporting on HDP, in comparison to the June 2015 elections (Early Parliamentary Elec-
tions, 2016, pp. 2–5 and 8). It can be pointed out that from 187 attacks against political 
parties during the election period, 168 were directed against HDP politicians. More than 
5,000 members of the party were taken into custody. This substantially limited HDP’s 
campaigning potential and also had a negative impact on electoral choices in the situ-
ation of charges of a terrorist organisation membership against more than 1,000 HDP 
activists (Çarkoğlu, Yıldırım, 2015, p. 62; Bardakçı, 2016, p. 14). In many provinces, 
the attacks against the activists of HDP supporting its candidate Demirtaş for President 
were observed also during the August 2014 elections (Republic of Turkey, Presidential 
Election, 2014, p. 14).
Undue influence
The second group within the category of “manipulation of vote choice” is undue in-
fluence which has two forms of so the called “carrots” and ”sticks.” In the first case it per-
tains to vote buying, having different forms in the Turkish case. On the one hand, there 
are many examples of distribution of goods to citizens, who are becoming party support-
ers thanks to the goods received. This has created an advantage for the AKP, which has 
large financial resources at its disposal. Apart from the above mentioned goods handed 
out at the election rallies, during the whole election period the AKP governments have 
distributed consumer durables, coal and food to the poor, vouchers as well as substantial 
agricultural subsidies (Akarca, 2015, p. 88).
On the other hand, there are many examples of particular forms of vote buying on 
a larger scale, resulting from the well-developed patronage system in Turkey. As Ali 
T. Akarca writes:
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“the incumbency advantage involves the ability to indulge in transfer activities 
such as providing services, subsidies and patronage, and picking locations for gov-
ernment investment and public work projects to attract supporters of other parties. 
There is a lot of anecdotal evidence of all Turkish incumbent parties, especially 
those in coalition governments, engaging in such activities. Financial support, in-
terest-free loans and tax advantages promised to women and young entrepreneurs, 
and reductions in the social security and health insurance premiums promised to 
small business owners and their elimination for new university graduates, increases 
in the scholarships given to university students by the AK Party before the Novem-
ber 2015 election are some examples of these” (Akarca, 2015, p. 88).
The patronage system is then not the AKP specificity. Yet, Erdoğan’s party has been 
able to use the particular kind of patronage relationship to its electoral advantage perfectly. 
A very good example, reflecting both the patronage and clientelism mechanism, is the work 
of the Turkey’s Mass Housing Administration (TOKİ), with the mechanism of distributing 
different material means (contracts, jobs and subsidised housing) for consolidating and 
expanding the electoral strength of the AKP. Construction companies have been receiving 
contracts from the government and in return have been more eager to support and finance 
the governing party activities and election campaigns. All this leads also to boosting the 
local economy. Thanks to these mechanisms the incumbents have regular supporters dur-
ing the elections (Marschall, Aydoğan, Bulut, 2016, pp. 201–212). Surely, in Turkey the 
patronage mechanisms are much more developed than the ones that we touched upon, and 
guarantee the electoral support of broader groups of conservative economic elites as well 
as religious brotherhoods and movements which, for example, receive land for their dorms 
and schools. Their support will not cease as thanks to the AKP staying in power they can 
survive and develop their activities (Taş, 2015, pp. 785–786).
The “sticks” in turn concern voter coercion and intimidation. Already in the case 
of the 2009 local elections many examples of this kind of electoral malpractice could 
be observed. Apart from attacking and fining the liberal media (Doğan Group) for not 
reporting correctly, similar measures were taken against individuals. Citizens ready to 
express their dissatisfaction with the economic policy of the government were not al-
lowed to do it, with police clamping down on protesters at the election rallies. Apart from 
using physical violence or arresting people, the AKP politicians threatened citizens that 
in case they did not vote in local elections for the AKP candidates, the municipalities 
would be deprived of public services (Eligür, 2009, p. 478). The atmosphere of fear was 
prevalent among civil servants or public sector employees, threatened they would lose 
their job should AKP lose the franchise. When it comes to the presidential campaign in 
2014, Erdoğan and other AKP politicians threatened the conservative electorate that they 
would be discriminated by the secular elites (Kalaycıoğlu, 2015, p. 169).
Conclusion
Turkey under the AKP has witnessed many legal deficits and “mispractices” concern-
ing different stages of the electoral process. However, different types of malpractices can 
be identified as well. A lot of them refer to the manipulation of vote choice (the second 
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category of the electoral malpractice according to Birch’s categorization) with particular 
negative role of the use of media coverage and campaign resources. These most im-
portant electoral malpractices are usually connected with activities of the single-party 
governments of the AKP, which uses the incumbency advantage (through the use of dif-
ferent resources being mainly at the disposal of the governing party) in order to preserve 
the support of the electorate or even increase it and at the same time restrict the area of 
party competition and electoral chances of the opposition. These manipulations go much 
beyond the time of the official election campaign and even the whole election period. 
They also include long-term measures taken during the whole legislative period, such as 
the strengthening of clientelistic and patronage networks, embracing a growing number 
of social groups being to a large extent dependent on incumbents and, therefore, forced 
to vote for the AKP. This would is the case with coalition governments, with the coalition 
partners, political contenders after all, check and mitigate one another.
The manipulations of vote choice calls the electoral integrity in Turkey into question. 
However, the long- and short-term electoral malpractices also contribute substantially to 
the process of shifting of pre-dominant party system to the dominant one. It is the next 
phase of the long-term process of strengthening majoritarianism after the 1980 mili-
tary coup in Turkey – through such measures as introduction of the 10 percent electoral 
threshold in general elections and regulations of Law on Political Parties (Aslan-Akman, 
2012, p. 81). The AKP era brought about the development of the aforementioned mal-
practices connected with incumbency advantage, leading to increasing domination of 
the governing party in the party system (together with gradual marginalization of the 
opposition) and political system as a whole. This poses a challenge for unconsolidated 
democracies, particularly when the malpractices are also about the use of clientelistic 
networks and are accompanied by populist policy (Aslan-Akman, 2012, pp. 80–81).
This negative impact in Turkey is twofold – direct and indirect. The electoral manipu-
lations are themselves manifestations of authoritarian tendencies developing in Turkey 
particularly in the second decade of the 21st century (Esen, Gümüşçü, 2016). However, 
even more dysfunctional is the indirect effect of malpractices on the political regime. An 
ever increasing domination of the AKP in the Turkish party and political system con-
solidated as a result of subsequent elections as well as more and more restrictive politi-
cal “level playing field’ have an adverse effect on the political regime due to specter of 
“tyranny of majority.” According to such authors as Leah Gilbert and Payam Mohseni, 
when the competitiveness is minimised, the regime cannot be called hybrid any more 
and is becoming authoritarian (Gilbert, Mohseni, 2011, pp. 281–293). On behalf of the 
majority the measures are taken by the AKP to strengthen the authoritarian tendencies. 
The 2017 referendum campaign on the constitutional changes introducing the so called 
presidential system became a new arena of different malpractices (again with particular 
negative role of the manipulation of vote choice) connected with incumbency advantage, 
which can be decisive as far as the change of the regime is concerned.
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Manipulowanie preferencjami wyborczymi 
 – czynnik ograniczający uczciwość wyborów w Turcji? 
 
Streszczenie
Od 1946 r., Turcja jest demokracją wielopartyjną – w państwie tym regularnie odbywają się wolne, 
konkurencyjne wybory. Jednak w ostatnim dziesięcioleciu, wraz z konsolidacją władzy przez Partię 
Sprawiedliwości i Rozwoju, pojawia się coraz więcej wątpliwości co do uczciwości wyborów. Partia 
rządząca zaczęła uciekać się do szeregu środków, ograniczających ich konkurencyjność. Celem arty-
kułu jest ukazanie skali nadużyć wyborczych w Turcji, z naciskiem na jeden z trzech głównych obsza-
rów manipulacji wyborczych, to jest manipulowanie “preferencjami wyborców” (vote choice), który 
wydaje się być najbardziej problematyczny. Ambicją autorów jest udzielenie odpowiedzi na pytanie, 
czy wybory w Turcji, mimo obserwowanych nieprawidłowości, nadal spełniają międzynarodowe stan-
dardy, czy też Turcja staje się ‘wyborczą autokracją’?
 
Słowa kluczowe: wybory, nieprawidłowość wyborcza, demokratyzacja, Turcja, Partia Sprawiedliwo-
ści i Rozwoju
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